

C U A S A NEWS

Carleton University Academic Staff Association

C.U.A.S.A. COUNCIL APPROVES TWO-DAY STUDY SESSION

Responsibility In Notifying Students Of Class Cancellations Urged

On January 22nd, the C.U.A.S.A. Council met and unanimously approved the Collective Bargaining Committee's proposal for a two-day study session (to be held January 30 and 31) to permit faculty to discuss the pros and cons of collective bargaining and the relationships between unionization and the threatened redundancies. In its motion, the Council also recommended that "all faculty who may wish to cancel classes in order to participate in the study session are urged to notify their students in advance and make arrangements for substitute lectures or labs if possible." Councilors stated their beliefs that the issues involved are of significant importance to the futures of all faculty. All faculty are urged to participate fully in the various activities of the study session.

Council January 22

At its January 22 meeting, Council's agenda included: Jeffrey Sack's legal advice on the status of CUASA in regard to certification; the report of the Collective Bargaining Committee which recommended the study session; a report on the status of the redundancy report and CUASA's activities in relation to it; and a report on a meeting between the Board of Governors and CUASA's negotiating teams on Severance Pay Policy. Discussion of the progress of the OCUFA-COU two-tier proposal (which is described in this newsletter) was deferred. Further details on the Council meeting will appear in the next newsletter.

Study Session Schedule

Thursday, January 30th:

Morning Sessions:

256 Mackenzie Engineering Building

10:00 a.m.: Panel of local speakers

11:00 a.m.: Coffee

11:15 a.m.: Unionization and redundancy

Afternoon Sessions:

406 Southam Hall

2:00 p.m.: C.A.U.T. Collective Bargaining Committee

3:30 p.m.: Coffee

4:00 p.m.: G. Bennett, O.C.U.F.A.,
The two-tier financing mechanism

Evening Session:

Faculty Club

7:30 p.m.: Question and Answer Session

Friday, January 31st

Morning:

10:00 a.m.: Membership for librarians
(Room 408 Southam) and
Professors' salary
differentials
(Room A230 Mackenzie)

Afternoon:

1:30 p.m.: General Meeting, Loeb C164

Legal Expert On Certification Visits Carleton

On January 14th, Jeffrey Sack (of Sack and Dunn) visited Carleton and spent a full day closeted with the Steering Committee gathering the evidence required to make a preliminary judgment on CUASA's case for certification by the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Mr. Sack is the legal expert provided by our parent bodies—OCUFA and CAUT—. A detailed eight-page report was presented to Council at its January 22nd meeting. Excerpts from the report will be available at the study session seminars. Sack's legal advice on CUASA's status will be outlined at the January 31st General Meeting.

In This Issue.

. . . some background material on collective bargaining is provided, as well as a description of the proposal being worked out by a joint committee of OCUFA and COU (made up of Ontario university presidents) for a province-wide system of salary negotiations between the universities and the government (the "two-tier" system). It should be noted that this proposal is not incompatible with collective bargaining by local associations.

In Addition. . .

. . . members are urged to consult:
— recent issues of the *CAUT Bulletin*, particularly that of SEPTEMBER 1974, which contains several perspectives on collective bargaining, including the article reprinted here, based on the experience of the recently certified University of Manitoba faculty association; and that of OCTOBER 1974, which includes "What is a Union?" by Marie-Claire Pomme, CAUT's labour relations officer for Ontario, and the CAUT's revised "Guidelines on Collective Bargaining".
— a "Collective Bargaining Package" assembled by OCUFA. Each Council member has a copy, and a few additional ones are available in the office (424 Physics).
— B.L. Adell and D.D. Carter, *Collective Bargaining for University Faculty in Canada*, Kingston, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1972.
— "Faculty Salaries and the Issue of Differentials", by Joseph Rose, a member of CAUT's Collective Bargaining Committee (copies will be available at the study session).

Special Issue On Collective Bargaining



"Some of us endangered species are getting together Saturday night for one last fling at the water hole."

Collective Agreement at St. Mary's

The Faculty Union and the Board of Governors of St. Mary's University, Nova Scotia have signed a first collective agreement. The Faculty Union was certified in April, 1974 under the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act as the bargaining agent of faculty members.

The agreement, a one year contract dated from September 1, 1974 deals with three main areas of concern — academic freedom and tenure, redundancy provisions and remuneration.

For the first time, faculty members have a binding contract guaranteeing democratic procedures relating to appointment, promotion, renewal, tenure and dismissal. In these matters, the individual faculty member has considerably more input into the decision-making process. All cases of dismissal now have ultimate resort to arbitration. Further progress in the area of academic freedom was made by the establishment of defined powers and procedures for selection of department chairmen and by a provision guaranteeing the rights of faculty members who run for political office.

The agreement requires that in the event of possible redundancy, the University administration must make a complete disclosure of the institution's financial position to the Senate and to the Faculty Union. In effect the Senate has the power of veto over redundancy proposals made by the administration.

Negotiated salary increases approximated an average of 12% while sabbatical leave payments were raised from 50% to 75% of annual salary.

The negotiated "Rand Formula" union security provision requires the employer to check off union dues for each employee in a bargaining unit.

The St. Mary's agreement embodies many of the guidelines contained in the Handbook of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, which provided the independent Faculty Union with assistance during certification and negotiations.

The agreement stands as explicit recognition of the right of faculty members to exercise a significant measure of authority in the academic decision-making process.

Grievance Panel

In November, a notice was sent to all faculty members outlining the process to be followed for the resolution of grievances for this academic year. The first step for a faculty member wishing to present a grievance is to contact the coordinator in writing, indicating the general nature of the grievance (promotion, salary, etc.) and listing the names of three members of the panel they wish to serve as their grievance committee.

The panel coordinator is David Bernhardt, Department of Psychology, 6310.

The completed list of panel members is as follows:

- D. Bernhardt, Psychology
- D. Dale, Mathematics
- N. Griffiths, History
- T. Hodge, Classics
- R. Jackson, Political Science
- R. Neill, Economics, St. Patrick's College

Some Suggested Advantages and Disadvantages of Collective Bargaining*

There has been a great deal of speculation about the effects of collective bargaining on colleges and universities. Because of the unique characteristics of higher education, collective bargaining in academic institutions may have special advantages and disadvantages.

The bulk of longitudinal experience with collective bargaining has been in industry. Academic collective bargaining is a recent phenomenon, and there are very few reliable studies of its actual impact on academic life and governance.

This report, addressed primarily to those unfamiliar with collective bargaining in higher education, reviews briefly some advantages and disadvantages, as seen by a variety of observers. One should bear in mind that in the absence of extensive experience and research the pros and cons listed below reflect opinions rather than established fact.

Some Suggested Advantages

From Union Members' Viewpoints

1. **Efficiency.** Collective bargaining is more efficient in representing faculty positions than some faculty or university senates. Often senate decision-making processes are ill-defined. Decisions are slow in coming, and the collegial process can be delayed interminably by administrative delay.

2. **Equality of Power.** Under collective bargaining faculty power increases and tends to approach equality with administrative power in areas covered by the bargaining contract. The union can demand agreed-upon performances from the administration, and when lacking, grievances can be promptly initiated and processed without undue administrative delay or interference.

3. **Legal Force.** Under traditional university policies and procedures, collective bargaining contracts carry the force of law. Their provisions cannot be ignored, changed informally or unilaterally by the administration. Provisions of the contract take precedence over trustee or administrative policies and regulations.

4. **Impasse Resolution.** Collective bargaining laws usually contain impasse procedures. Various methods, including the use of outside mediators and fact-finders may be used to resolve bargaining conflict. Under such procedures, the administration cannot simply veto the recommendations of the faculty, or refuse to attend meetings called for the purpose of settling broad concerns of faculty.

5. **Communication.** The requirement that both parties bargain in good faith facilitates better communication between faculty and administration. A continuous and meaningful dialogue is ordinarily guaranteed by the law. Information must be shared under the terms


of most labor laws. Salary, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment become matters of frank and open discussion. Furthermore, the bargaining process assures that differences between administratively announced policy and actual practice do not escape full discussion.

6. **Understanding the Institution.** The process of collective bargaining usually leads to better understanding of the workings of the institution. In the course of lengthy discussions on matters of mutual concern, each party comes to better understand the needs and constraints of the other. Moreover, in quantifying and setting priorities on those needs and constraints during the bargaining process, each party comes to be familiar with the financial and policy constraints required for viability of the institution.

7. **Individual Problems.** Collective bargaining provides a mechanism for the resolution of individual problems. It is said that under traditional academic government, individual faculty concerns may be inefficiently or inadequately reviewed. Under grievance procedures specified in a legal contract, such concerns are more likely to be brought forward, clarified, and resolved in a thorough and just manner.

8. **Definition of Policy.** Collective bargaining fosters definition of administrative policy and procedure. The latitude for administrative judgment is usually clarified and defined, especially in personnel decisions. This puts everyone on notice as to what to expect and when. Administrative decisions are then processed more evenhandedly throughout the campus or system.

9. **Rights Guarantee.** The written contract which results from bargaining usually guarantees many employee rights. Personnel procedures, including grievance procedures, are well defined and have a legal and binding effect. Disputes are not subject to the final interpretation of an administrator, but that of



"It's a list of our demands."

*Adapted from the Academic Collective Bargaining Information Services Special Report No. 1

an impartial third party, such as a provincial labour relations board or a court of law. This procedure minimizes the abuse of administrative power.

10. *Faculty Compensation.* Collective bargaining has produced notable gains in faculty compensation in some areas.

11. *Self-determination.* Collective bargaining usually increases the faculty member's responsibility in decisions about his or her own career (in such matters as fringe benefits, salary, appointment, promotion, sick leave, tenure, work load, working conditions, etc.).

12. *Administrative Evaluation.* In certain situations, collective bargaining may diminish the role of merit increases in faculty compensation. Merit adjustments may be less favored or actually eliminated under the contract. Increases are thereafter given for experience on the job. Performance evaluations become somewhat less important. Standardized salaries will help eliminate petty jealousies among faculty members, since all will be treated alike.

13. *Younger Faculty.* Younger faculty members view collective bargaining as a method to protect their access to promotion and continuing pay increases. In a traditional system, senior faculty exercise greater power than their numbers might warrant. But unionism is a system of one man, one vote. If their numbers are substantial, young faculty gain power through the vote.

14. *Minorities.* Collective bargaining helps women and minorities by fostering an equal pay schedule; by devising effective grievance procedures; standardizing performance evaluation procedures; standardizing other job-oriented policies and procedures such as recruitment and appointment, dismissal or non-renewal, promotion and tenure. In addition, institutions, by law, are not permitted to bargain with unions which practice discrimination in any form. In short, collective bargaining procedures and contracts provide an effective weapon to help enforce equal opportunity laws and regulations.

15. *Institutional Loyalty.* The collective bargaining process gives faculty greater decision-making power within the institution. This will hopefully foster increased identification with university goals and policies, since the faculty role in formulating such goals is guaranteed.

16. *Educational Policy.* Collective bargaining, where collegial governance has been weak, will place more responsibility for internal educational matters in the hands of the faculty who are the educational experts.

17. *Competitive Power.* With regard to public institutions, unionization enables faculty to compete more successfully with other public agencies and services for available tax funds. Other public employees are likely to be already unionized and in a strong competitive position. In private institutions, unionization may help the faculty to persuade Trustees and administrators to give faculty salaries a higher priority in budgeting available funds.

18. *Consistency of Service.* Collegial governance and individual bargaining only serve effectively when there is a shortage of scholars such as in the '60's. Collective bargaining can protect the interests of faculty even when there is a shortage of jobs.

19. *Strengthening Collegiality.* Union contracts can strengthen collegial governance by specifying subjects and procedures of consultation and agreement prior to administrative action.

Some Suggested Disadvantages

From Faculty Members' Viewpoints

1. *Increased Costs.* Union dues are a burden to most faculty members. Costs range as high as 1% of salary.

2. *Loss of Flexibility.* Individual faculty lose their ability to negotiate their own salaries, leaves, hours and grievances because unions usually require considerable conformity. Unions, at times, feel compelled to discipline individual members for poor performance, giving the faculty member an additional boss.

3. *Inappropriateness of Job Actions.* Job actions (e.g., strikes, sick-ins, etc.) are considered by many professionals to be inappropriate in the collegial community of higher education and such actions will seldom be supported by them. Strikes may also be prohibited. This leaves a union without benefit of a major bargaining weapon and offers little improvement over collegial governance bargaining power.

4. *Increased Bureaucracy.* A new and larger bureaucracy, the centralization of power at the bargaining table, and the new detailed contractual procedures may have a homogenizing and standardizing influence on the campus. This is antithetical to the purposes of higher education, which attempts to foster diversity of views and approaches. This also can affect the ability of departments, divisions and faculties to use different personnel requirements, standards and approaches in serving differing clienteles.

5. *Unfavorable Power Shifts.* Collective bargaining brings about shifts in power within institutions. For example, where the union is dealing with the same or similar issues, the role of the faculty senate can be jeopardized. In addition, under an increasing centralization of procedures and policy formulation, the traditional independence, pluralism and power of departments may be altered. Moreover, administrators may be required to act more like management, exercising powers of supervision and control more like their industrial counterparts to be certain that contract provisions are adhered to.

6. *Increased Adversary Relationships.* Collective bargaining often becomes an adversarial approach to decision-making. Such an approach derives from industrial models or organizations which may not be appropriate for colleges and universities. Under such models, educational policy may become the result of tense compromise negotiation, involving a combination of financial, governance, and educational issue, rather than scholarly decision-making in an atmosphere of academic freedom.

7. *Increased Demands on Faculty.* Future salary increases for faculty may only be gained "in return for" increased "productivity." For example, trustees or provincial governments may bargain or impose increased work load requirements and limit research facilities, sick leave, and sabbaticals.

8. *Diminished University Autonomy.* In the case where the funding agent is external to the institution — a provincial government for example — it is argued that there is a tendency for the governmental agent to deal directly with the union in negotiation. Indeed, this is sometimes written into the law. This not only weakens institutional autonomy, but may destroy the effective role of trustees in university governance. This could put the entire concept of collegial governance in jeopardy.

9. *Resort to Exaggeration and Emotions.* Exaggerated claims and emotional demands from both sides of the table are ordinarily part of the bargaining process. Such claims are not

From Administrators' Viewpoints

1. *Increased Costs.* Collective bargaining significantly increases institutional costs. A new bureaucracy is needed to back up the negotiating team and to administer the contract. This would include labor relations experts, legal counsel, hearing officers, statisticians, and so on. Bargaining also takes considerable time of university academic and business officers without reducing their normal workloads.

2. *Loss of Flexibility.* Once a collective bargaining contract has been signed, the reference point of all contract-related policies, procedures, and grievances become the contract. Institutional flexibility and administrative decision-making power may be weakened.

3. *Inappropriateness of Job Actions.* Aggressive unions have, under certain conditions, promoted strikes, inflammatory articles in union newspapers, boycotting of faculty meetings, etc., to promote union goals. Use of such weapons promotes campus controversy and adversarial relationships which in turn may decrease institutional efficiency, integrity, and viability.

4. *Increased Bureaucracy.* A new and large bureaucracy, the centralization of power at the bargaining table, and the new detailed contractual procedures may have a homogenizing and standardizing influence on the campus. This is antithetical to the purposes of higher education, which attempts to foster diversity of views and approaches. When a bargaining unit includes several campuses, the individual campus often loses its ability to bargain contracts that meet needs of its special faculties, programs, location, clientele, size, etc.

consonant with the aims of higher education which has the traditional duty to foster a regard for truth and to avoid advocacy.

10. *Loss of Student Representation.* Students may become casualties at the bargaining table. Ordinarily they do not participate in collective bargaining discussions, and student welfare may be partially sacrificed in the course of negotiation. Increases in faculty compensation and improvements in working conditions may be paid for by higher tuition. In addition, contract negotiations may focus on a variety of matters in which students have a legitimate and vital interest, including class size, faculty-student ratios, faculty evaluation and curricular matters. Finally, the failure of negotiations might lead to a faculty strike which could interrupt students' education.

11. *Standardized Pay.* Standardized pay increases have a high priority among some unions and some faculty members who have been promoted more slowly than average. This policy could eliminate or minimize merit incentives and thereby prevent adequate rewards for outstanding service. This may lead to a lower standard of performance by some faculty members, especially if administrative evaluation of faculty deteriorates or is limited and tenure is strengthened. Outstanding professors may leave, and the standardized restrictions on starting salary may make it difficult to attract others of equal caliber. Standardized pay for most institutions, in the long run, means mediocre faculty.

12. *Funding Problems.* Collective bargaining may foster coordination problems in the funding process. Thus, a university may reach an agreement with its faculty union, and find out subsequently that the government will not finance it. Such instances have caused strikes and near-strikes.

13. *Loss of Some Diversity.* Universities traditionally have been havens for diversity and individual rights. Yet, collective bargaining laws ordinarily call for exclusive bargaining agents — unions which have the exclusive right to bargain with management on salary, fringe benefits, working conditions, etc. Outstanding scholars may be barred from bargaining individually with institutions. Less mobility for faculty and more institutional rigidity could result.

14. *Involuntary Contributions.* Allied to the preservation of diversity and individuality is the financing of the bargaining agent. Where the union cannot obtain adequate financing from voluntary dues, it bargains for other means, such as an agency shop (where, as a condition of continued employment, each member of the bargaining unit is required to pay the union the equivalent of his share of union costs incurred in representing him). This may be an unacceptable restraint for many faculty members.

15. *Loss of Traditional Faculty Rights.* It is claimed that academic freedom and tenure could be lost at the bargaining table. Conceivably, these could be traded off for other advantages.

16. *Loss of Self Determination.* Under the collective bargaining laws, agencies outside the university can make the final determination as to who is a member of the faculty bargaining unit. There are often a number of contended cases, such as the case of non-teaching professionals, or part-time teachers. The outside agencies have sometimes chosen to place such groups within the faculty unit. It is argued that this may impair faculty integrity. Such groups have interests which are not entirely similar to teaching faculty.

17. *Loss of Self Governance.* Academic freedom and institutional autonomy could be impaired by impasse resolution procedures. Some say that unionization places new strictures on institutions by resorting to outside arbitrators. It is argued that such arbitrators do not understand the unique characteristics of higher education.

18. *Loss of Full Participation of Faculty.* Some unions do not represent the broad spectrum of faculty simply because many faculty refuse to join the union or to take part in union activities. Regardless of reason, the university suffers when any important segment of its faculty refuse to participate in campus governance.

19. *Credibility.* Under collegial governance, the faculty and administration can do their bargaining, e.g., over salaries, within the family, and then present a united front to the governing body. Under collective bargaining, the campus president cannot publicly support faculty demands for salary increases. When different points of view from two segments of the same campus are made public, the credibility of the institution and its needs can be undermined.

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Vademecum of a Campus Unionizer

by M. Debicki

This article leaves aside the primary question of whether any Faculty Association should seek the recognition as a bargaining agent on behalf of the faculty. It is not meant to assist in making this kind of decision—it is rather designed for those Faculty Associations which, for their own reasons, decide to pursue that avenue of relationship between university administration and the faculty. It is based on the experience of one Faculty Association in its long struggle towards recognition as a collective bargaining agent, thus many of the points are of a parochial nature. However, I believe that at least some of our experiences are of a universal character and can be of some utility to other Faculty Associations which either entertain the possibility of pursuing recognition under their respective labor relations acts, or have already made that decision. Three essential areas will be discussed in this Vademecum for a Labour Organizer on the Campus:—Legal questions, political considerations, and practical advice.

Legal Questions

Any Faculty Association which entertains the thought of seeking recognition as a bargaining agent on the behalf of the professors, has to be very aware and educate itself in the type of legal problems which it will encounter. You cannot rely solely on the services of lawyers, in that endeavor. The labor legislation usually is not prohibitive for a layman, and although legal services are essential, academics can and should familiarize themselves with pertinent legislation. This is necessary also because the lawyers often will have difficulty in translating labor legislation so that it becomes applicable to the academic scene.¹ Secondly, the Faculty Association should acquire a good working knowledge (if it does not already have such knowledge) of the provincial legislation dealing with their respective universities, and also with all the range of University by-laws which will become a part of the legal "pingpong". Amongst some of the most important legal questions with which the Faculty Associations will have to be familiar are the following:

1. It is very important that in the initial stage, the Faculty Associations must acquire a very clear understanding as to whether their particular organization falls under the general clause of a labor union, under the respective provincial labor relations Acts. Sometimes it is much easier to re-draft the constitution of the Faculty Association prior to filing an application for certification, rather than to discover during the proceedings before the labor board, that the constitution or organization of the faculty does not meet with the requirements of the particular labor relations act.
2. In applying for certification, the Faculty Association has to familiarize itself with procedures under the labor relations act and relevant regulations governing an application for certification by labor relations boards, since it is quite likely that Faculty Associations will have to produce a series of relatively old and forgotten documents—such as minutes of the first meetings, etc. All these steps and all the necessary documents should be checked prior to application as it is important that the application is not judged defective on procedural grounds.

¹ Ed. Note: According to the CAUT Committee on Collective Bargaining, if an association is considering certification and intends to secure the services of a lawyer, it should do so only after consultation with the CAUT. In many cases questions relating to preliminary problems can be satisfactorily answered, free of charge, by the members of the Collective Bargaining Committee or the CAUT officers in charge of collective bargaining. The CAUT, through its Collective Bargaining Committee is also able to provide faculty associations with general aid in the actual drafting of the collective agreement.

3. It is very important to have a very clear understanding of who is the party of the case. You will find out that in the process of your application, one of the greatest difficulties you will encounter will be individuals who, either on the grounds of conscience or some other reasons, object to the application. They, under most labor relations acts, can be individuals, "parties to the case", and make the whole procedure very complicated and tiresome. If the Faculty Association from the beginning has a clear understanding of the possibilities as to limiting the number of "parties to the case", or if it can in some other way group the opposition into a single entity, this might prove to be advantageous.

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4. Acquisition of a working knowledge of the university administration and the general by-laws. In this regard, the Faculty Association will have to be of significant assistance (and a constant source of input) to the legal personnel during the proceedings. This point deals with the organizational structure of the university. One of the main points of this exercise is to acquire a clear understanding of the vertical and horizontal organization of the University. That is, the Faculty Association has to be clear as to the legal powers and the role of the senate, academic administrators (in many applications this will become a very important issue) and horizontal sharing in decision-making by all the members of the academic community.
5. The determination of the boundaries of the unit. Depending on how you describe the outer boundaries of the unit, your application may have—or avoid—certain difficulties. In many of the applications, the source of opposition will come from professional employees. The University of Manitoba certainly encountered this difficulty. We are perhaps the most "unlucky" Faculty Association, in the sense that our Labor Relations Act has perhaps the worst definition of a "professional" in Canada. The definition which our Labor Relations Act uses under Section 1 Para. 1, is so broad that it caused our association an enormous number of problems. The statute does not require that a professional is one who performs professional functions in the course of his employment, but rather relates to his formal status as a member of a profession, (or his eligibility to be one) regardless of what, *de facto* he is doing. Many people on our campus, who clearly do not act in their professional capacities as lawyers, dentists, doctors, interior designers, etc., were able to claim, or at least pursue the claim, that they have a professional status and thus they should be excluded from the unit. One of the most complicated cases on many campuses would be that of medical schools, where joint appointments with hospitals are not an exception.
6. The last legal issue is one of voluntary recognition. Most labor relations acts, in different forms, provide for voluntary recognition. There are several advantages to pursuing this avenue. It is less time-consuming, it costs less, and, perhaps it reduces a climate of political hostility. However, the most negative factor in voluntary recognition is one that the conditions of the voluntary recognition usually can be, at least to some degree, set by the respective parties. Therefore the type of bargaining and the newly emerging functional inter-dependence between the faculty and administration can be—to a much larger extent—determined by the employers.

To end this part with a general comment, one has to expect in making an application for certification, that one will encounter many unusual legal problems. The labor relations acts in Canada were primarily designed to deal with industrial models, where the demarcation lines are clearer than in the university, and where the distinction

between labor and management is more clearly drawn. The university, with its evolutionary organizational development is ill-suited to labor legislation. Re-interpretation of the labor legislation produces difficulties, even in those cases where there is no opposition to the certification. Certainly when the opposition to certification is vigorous, the basic weakness of the design of this type of legislation will produce several difficulties.

Political considerations

The political considerations are perhaps even more important than the legal requirements and technicalities of proceeding with the application. From the experience on our campus, one can highlight some of the most important ones (with the understanding that these will have to be looked at from the perspective of local conditions).

1. Conditions under which unionization is considered in the university usually occur in the climate of hostility between administration and the faculty. Thus a certain degree of polarization is unavoidable.
2. This usually is combined with a period of decline or negative growth of the University, which produces additional tensions and additional pressures on both faculty and administration.
3. Universities have what I call a "dual political culture". On the one hand, we have the model of a "plutonic academy" of free scholars, who are to a large extent, independent, not only in their thought processes but in the way in which they perform their jobs. On the other hand, the increased enrolments in the universities during the last decade produced the development of corporate structures within the universities. Thus you have interaction of these two cultures—one individualistic, based on independence (working alone), and on the other hand, you have the corporate organizational model, which is intentionally copying business corporations with their hierarchical organizations, treating Universities to a large extent, in a quantitative manner.

in many applications the source of opposition is the professional employees...

4. Universities frequently live in a state of confusion as to the functions of university structures—i.e. Senates, Faculty Councils, and Administrations. This confusion is even increased by the fact that in many universities the corporate managers emerge from the ranks of academics. It is not infrequent that some of the best academics are moving into the administrative roles. Thus their employees do not necessarily perceive them as corporate managers, but frequently see them as their colleagues and members of the academic community. The administrators, not infrequently, perceive themselves as academics rather than as administrators. Yet on functional grounds this clearly cannot be defended.
5. Faculty Associations in their traditional roles are not equipped to cope with the new functions of initiating and carrying through unionization and collective bargaining. Any Faculty Association which entertains the thought of collectivization, has to recognize that the time when the Faculty Association could be run over a cup of coffee in the faculty club—perhaps with a glass of brandy—is gone with the application. The Faculty Association in the process of collectivization has to be professionalized. Running this new type of association becomes almost a full time job. Also, it is essential that a much larger number of people must become involved in the workings of the Faculty Association—during and after collective bargaining. If you look ahead after you are recognized as a bargaining agent, just the preparation of the contract on which you want to negotiate is enormously time-consuming. Most universities have employment relations offices, with people whose full-time job will be (or is already) to design bargaining positions vis

à vis the faculty. For most of us, this is a voluntary service which is given over and above our normal duties as teachers and scholars. One cannot over-exaggerate the pressure on the people who are actively involved in the Faculty Association, in terms of time and a new type of expertise which is needed. Some of you will have to be familiarized with the labor legislation, others with collective bargaining, others with different types of contracts, and still others will have to have a very clear understanding of the by-laws and workings of the University. This perhaps is one of the greatest difficulties and dangers in pursuing the avenue of unionization.

6. It is also politically important to think of—and establish—policies dealing with the relationship between the Faculty Association and other unions on campus. The Faculty Association has to develop a clear-cut policy dealing with agglomerations of unions and joining other unions outside the university. There are enormous dangers which the Faculty Association has to face, since it most likely will be approached by the big international or national unions, which do not necessarily have similar goals to those of the academics. Faculty Associations are facing the possibility of being "swallowed up" by a union which does not necessarily have a common interest with academics.

conditions for unionization are created through a climate of hostility between the administration and the faculty

7. Relationships with students during the period of discussing and entering into legal steps leading towards certification, are of the utmost importance. It is possible—even likely—that the students will be apprehensive about the unionization of their faculties. Students very frequently will expect an increase in fees, as a result of unionization. Some will think that the quality of education will suffer as a result of certification. At all costs, one has to avoid the possibility of the students being used as a "pingpong" between conflicting parties in the case.
8. The final political consideration is that of the relationship between CAUT and the Faculty Association, in the process of application for certification. Any Faculty Association which is pursuing the route of collective bargaining will be greatly assisted by the expertise of the people in CAUT. This is the route through which one can have access to the experience of other universities, and CAUT should be seen as a possible future agglomeration or congress of faculty unions.

Practical advice

There are many practical considerations which have to be taken into account. Among them, the most important ones seem to be:—

1. Secure the services of people with legal, union, and political campaigning experience. These three categories of people seem to have the essential characteristics needed in the initial process of unionization. Legal personnel is a necessity. However, it is also good, as well as having a retained lawyer, to secure the services of other lawyers, preferably from the local law school (if there is one on campus) who can serve as translators of the legal messages coming from the barristers. They can also translate the position, complexities and idiosyncracies of the university into terms understood by downtown barristers. People with political campaigning experience are of high utility to the Faculty Association. Many associations will face the necessity of preparing for voting, in order to determine the wishes of the faculty members. In such situations, people with political campaign experience are invaluable in organizing the faculty members who are sympathetic to the cause of the association. People with union experience can help the Faculty Association to

avoid pit-falls, and can be useful in attempting to stop the developing hysteria on campus by dealing with the syndromes of so-called "clock-punching" — "nine-to-five" and other allegedly "necessary evils" of unionization.

2. Secure the support of outstanding scholars. You will likely be involved in labor relations hearings, and the testimonies of outstanding scholars will be of importance to the Faculty Association. The services and support of outstanding scholars are also important, since many of the Faculty Associations will be charged with support of mediocrity or even incompetency—the allegation being that some academics are afraid of the open market and want the union in order to protect their job security. Thus, if many of the outstanding scholars support unionization, this argument is less likely to be used by the opposition.
3. Avoid alienation of those faculty members who are not sympathetic or who have reservations regarding unionization. It very often might become the case that active members of the Faculty Association become so emotionally involved in the cause of unionization, that they treat those who disagree as "enemies".
4. Be very careful in retaining legal counsel. It is not only a good labor lawyer who is needed by the Faculty Association. It is essential that the lawyer be able to communicate with academics. You need a lawyer who in some sense is a scholar in his own right, or at least has academic interests. Such a lawyer will find it easier to converse with university professors who do not easily abandon their role as teachers.
5. Lines of communication with the administration must be kept open. In the period of very frequent hostilities on the campus, before and during the process of certification, it is very easy to reach a situation in which the administration perceives the route of certification as an act of hostility and lack of confidence. At this point the Faculty Association might close the lines of communication with the administration, or vice-versa. This situation should be avoided. People with experience in collective bargaining stress that there are frequently "double

faculty might be approached by international or national unions which do not necessarily have similar goals to those of academics

negotiations"—one formal set of meetings, but also informal communications between the two parties, which are perhaps of more importance than the formal ones. During the whole process of certification, lines of communication should be kept open.

These remarks are not meant to discourage Faculty Associations from pursuing collective bargaining or certification. The intent is only to present some of the difficulties and to stress the enormous amount of work which the Faculty Association will face in this new endeavor. Whether this new structural device—new at least in terms of Canadian campuses—will prove to be satisfactory is impossible to say, since only very few universities in Canada have this kind of mechanism—and for a relatively short period of time at that. Personally, I believe that unionization opens a new era of a more democratic university, or if you wish—a return to the "Golden Age" of *Universitas* among "Studii Generalis".

Professor Debicki teaches Political Science at St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba and spoke on collective bargaining at the annual meeting of CAUT in Toronto.

Opinion Forum

"No Final Solutions"

By now every faculty member on campus must be aware of the necessity faced by this University to make rapid and sizable savings in its budget shortfall. This general awareness, already turning in some areas to real personal alarm, ought to be channeled into purposeful activity. Faculty members should neither leave it up to the Administration to bail them out nor acquiesce supinely in letting it fire them. To start with, then, the very least they can do is think hard about suggesting practical, fair minded ways to cut the cost of operations. The organization for assessing and perhaps implementing such suggestions now exists. We ought all to help it succeed.

But because these savings will come nowhere near meeting the deficit, we would be irresponsible not to acknowledge that the salary budget also must be cut. I have argued elsewhere how I think this should be done, but however it is done, it is in essence a matter of saving money. We can affirm, as the document quite properly does, that positions and not persons are redundant; but merely to shuffle re-trained faculty around is not to make budget cuts. Hence for some the simplest way to do this is to cut staff. For many others, those actually on the line, an equally simple way is to impose across-the-board salary restraints, graduated according to ability to "go short." Those in the upper salary ranges, as I am, would take a fair-sized cut in pay; those around the median would forego an increase, those at the bottom would get a small raise. The distribution would not be difficult; the sacrifices certainly would be.

That, however, is my main point. This way only minimal sacrifices are asked of all or, at least, of many; the ultimate sacrifice is asked of no one. Nor, indeed, is it asked of the University itself. Consider the argument made against this alternative by our various executives, those in Administration, in Dean-ships, in CUASA: "The best people will go." "Carleton mustn't be a backwater college." "If the deadwood stay, Carleton will become a swamp." Naturally executives are against forms of salary restraint. Outright firings are quick, simple, permanent, final. The problem is solved. That isn't a strange attitude. What is strange is the vagueness with which they bandy about meaningless terms like "best people" and "deadwood." They seem to forget, in their readiness to demand individual sacrifices for the collective good, that when we fire trained, competent, useful, enthusiastic teachers, the University is itself suffering an irreparable sacrifice. Their loss will diminish the whole — practically and morally.

And what, really, do their arguments amount to? "Go" — go where? Those who stay are in the same boat as those who are fired: Humanists, who will endure the bulk of the firings, have nowhere to go. Perhaps, years ago, we overhired. Perhaps the graduate schools over-produced. Perhaps our executives over-estimated enrolments. Let all suffer minimally but no individuals exclusively for these mischances. As for "best" — what is their definition of best? Surely it cannot mean persons who object to working in an economically run university; who feel it demeans them to earn less money than their counterparts in richer places; who don't care if their colleagues and friends are reduced to unemployment so long as they get their regular annual pay raise. Surely not!

But neither ought it to mean those famous individuals who have run up imposing lists of works published, papers given, conferences attended, travel grants received. It is possible that the executives really believe that such professors are valuable attractors of students. This may well be true in such unaffected areas as Engineering and Social Sciences, certainly at the doctoral level. But I doubt strongly that it has any significant effect at all in the Humanities, where, again, the bulk of cuts is doomed to fall. These people are indispensable only if their teaching quality is at least fairly commensurate with their scholarly fame. Even if it isn't I am not saying that they are the ones who qualify for redundancy. Indeed, I would even concede that they should be red circled and paid premium salaries; it would have little effect on the budget for their numbers are small. What I am arguing is that the slight risk we run of losing their services ought not to blind us to the necessity of dealing humanely with the large majority, who are not in their fortunate bargaining position.

Yet I am still not satisfied with even this definition of the "best people." Referring, again, to the Humanities, not indeed as a spokesman and emphatically not because Applied, Social, and Pure Scientists are not also in the broader sense Humanists themselves (as from personal experience I know them to be) but because practical exigencies confine my remarks to that area, I would offer this definition: The best people are those who devote themselves with all the sincerity in their power to applying, in their teaching, their research and publishing, their University service, the best ideals of humanism and principles of rationality that wholehearted devotion to their own Humanities discipline has taught them. These are the best people. How will they react when, awarded their salary increases, they see their colleagues and friends left jobless, disheartened, bereft of their professions? Will these best people say, "They deserved to go; we didn't; so be it"? Will it not rather happen that they themselves, irremediably hurt, cease to love Carleton as they love it now? Will they perhaps bide their time until one day they too can leave — voluntarily? Will, indeed, the best people go — not because they had to take pay cuts but because they weren't asked to?

For this reason, among many reasons, I urge the University to consider seriously alternatives to the dismissal-without-cause of competent but unemployable people, and, if it won't, that Divisions and even Departments unilaterally take steps to effect necessary budget cuts, even if this means insisting on the right to achieve the desired results in dollar terms through techniques different from the strictly defined ones of individual sacrifice laid out in the document. To be specific: why shouldn't a department declare collectively and unequivocally that no one position, no one member, of their body is redundant, but that, since their total salary budget is excessive, each and every member is in a sense partially redundant. Hence each one will help to cure the budget redundancy, either by general salary restraints or by the even more attractive method of occasional but regular unpaid leave. And to objectors the short answer has to be, "Will you volunteer for redundancy?"

Like capital punishment, the firing of an unfortunate but blameless few is a final solution. Once gone, no one will mourn them — except the true Humanists, the real "best people." Surely less drastic solutions are, in the long run, better for all. Any sacrifice short

of outright joblessness offers some kind of future hope. If people are fired, Queen's Park need only shrug. The Federal Government will pay the unemployment insurance, and when that runs out, the city will pay the welfare benefits. But salary restraints, of whatever type and distribution CUASA and the Administration deem proper, will not be so conveniently final for Queen's Park, so easily shrugged off. The problem will have been temporarily alleviated and by very visible, very practical sacrifices — but not permanently wiped out. For Queen's Park it will remain as an embarrassment and for the general public it will stand as an example of group sacrifice. Future improvement can come about. There will be hope for all of us. But if we go the way of the Final Solution there will be, for the chosen victims, no hope at all.

Douglas Wurtele

Response to "No Final Solutions"

One of the most obvious characteristics of the many discussions and proposals to which I have listened in the past few horrible months has been the wide-spread belief that, whatever solutions we collectively choose to solve our collective problems, they must be applied equally to everyone. Now this approach seems on the surface to be fair and equitable but in fact it quickly becomes evident that the effects of an equal application of any of the solutions thus far proposed are neither just nor fair. To give a few examples, neither the proposal to achieve significant budgetary savings through equal, across-the-board salary cuts nor the proposal to achieve the same effects through an across-the-board sharing of redundancy has just and equitable effects. In fact, we are discovering with Aristotle that the notion of distributive justice (giving to each his "due") may be more relevant.

My response to Professor Wurtele's proposal is based on this assumption: Only through a combination of measures *differentially applied* can we devise a solution which approximates a just and equitable result.

First, I would argue (in the realm of facts, for the moment) that unless the current parameters of the situation change radically — such as the government relenting — the solution proposed by Professor Wurtele would not generate sufficient long-term budgetary savings unless the salary cuts imposed were so large that they would have very negative results in some divisions and at the lower ranks in particular. Having said this, I do not now propose to dismiss his proposal just because I don't think it would work as a just and equitable solution if applied on an across-the-board basis. I do think that some modifications to the proposal could make it one part of an acceptable solution. If, for example, those divisions which may be asked to assume the lion's share of the redundancy burden democratically decided that salary cuts (which would introduce for the first time salary differentials among the divisions at Carleton) were preferable to the loss of significant numbers of faculty I would assume that the university community would accept such a proposal. I would also assume, however, that equity would require some compensation to those faculty members who voluntarily accepted a loss of income in such circumstances. Such things as the possibility of obtaining sabbatical leave after five years instead of after six as would continue to be the case for the rest of the university could be examined in this context.

The basic point to be made, I would repeat, is that any of the possible methods of

attempting to solve our current problems will be unacceptable if they are imposed on an across-the-board basis simply because the circumstances of the various segments of the community are so different. Many methods of saving money have been proposed and rejected because of their negative effects (in human and academic terms) on one or two sections of the university. Some of them should be re-considered as part of a more complex method which achieves savings through the use of different techniques in different parts of the university. Proposals related to summer school, salary, programme re-organization and consolidation, and reduction in service should be re-examined on this kind of basis.

J.M. Vickers

Dr. Jill Vickers
President
C.U.A.S.A.

Dear Dr. Vickers:

Being on leave this year, I have tried to avoid taking part in the many discussions about redundancy. The report in TWTT (January 14, 1975) of the APC meeting of 7 January, however, contains a paragraph which frightens me. We are told that a motion was approved which stated that there be "no universal freeze on faculty salaries, *voluntary or otherwise*, which would put Carleton at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other universities (italics mine)."

Whether one considers that salary restraint ought to be considered among the several possible solutions to financial stringency (as I do), or not, this motion from the APC is totally unacceptable. First of all, the entire issue of faculty salaries is *ultra vires* for the APC; if it can pass a motion saying that no freeze will be contemplated, it could just as easily pass a motion saying that *all* faculty salaries will be frozen. It is my understanding that the President, for the Administration, and the Salary Committee for C.U.A.S.A. are the only acceptable sources for statements concerning faculty salaries. I believe that this motion of the APC should be publicly condemned by you as President of C.U.A.S.A., and that the APC should be told to restrict its work to academic planning.

The second aspect of the motion that raises my ire is the attempt on the part of the APC to control *voluntary* action by the faculty. If the motion had said that the APC could not accept an *enforced* wage freeze, one could have understood its position, even though disagreeing with it. As it is, the committee's belief that it has either the right or the ability to prevent any kind of *voluntary* effort by faculty members is ludicrous and suggests that the committee now considers itself to be the final arbiter for the consciences of faculty members.

When a committee of this university starts telling members of the faculty that it will not allow them to undertake voluntary actions which they might feel to be in the best interests of Carleton, that committee ought to be put in its place quickly and forcefully.

I would hope, Dr. Vickers, that whatever your own position might be on the question of salary restraint, and whatever the official position of C.U.A.S.A., you will see the threat to all of us contained in this motion of the APC, and that you will tell that committee to stick to its own business — a business which includes neither the question of faculty salaries nor the voluntary actions of faculty members.

R.G. Laird
Department of English

Ed. note: The offending passage was removed from the guidelines at the February 20 APC meeting at the request of the CUASA observer.

A Province-Wide Approach to Academic Salaries:

Progress Report from Ad Hoc
OCUFA / Presidents Working Group,
January 1975

Introduction

The first discussion of a provincial academic staff salary determination system between representatives of the universities and faculty members took place at a meeting of the COU* Executive Committee attended by the OCUFA** representatives on May 2, 1974. On that occasion, there was a general exchange of views, and an agreement to continue discussions. Following the meeting, the Executive Vice-Chairman of OCUFA wrote to the Executive Director of COU conveying resolutions of the OCUFA Council which proposed discussions with COU on a provincial cooperative salary determination system. This was discussed by the COU Executive, which agreed that further discussions were appropriate. The Executive thought, however, that COU should not play the role of opposite party to OCUFA; it was concluded that further discussions should be between representatives of the presidents and OCUFA. As a result, a meeting of the presidents was convened during the summer, with the OCUFA proposal as the major item of discussion. The presidents agreed to proceeding as proposed by the COU Executive, and representatives were appointed to meet with OCUFA.

The initial OCUFA/presidents meeting took place on August 8 with the president represented by Presidents Bourns and Olive, and Principal Deutsch, and OCUFA represented by Professors Bowen, Chambers, and Ord. Subsequent to the first meeting, President Evans replaced Principal Deutsch. Meetings have continued through the Fall approximately once a month, with the exchange of working papers between meetings. The working group believes that it has now explored the parameters of a possible provincial salary negotiation system sufficiently to put together a distillation of its present thinking in the form of a progress report. The object of this report is to inform administrative and faculty representatives from each of the institutions of the present thinking of the group, to solicit reactions, and to seek authority for further more detailed explorations along the lines set out below.

Implications of a Province-Wide Approach to Academic Salaries

Under the present BIU system it is the annual government announcement of operating grants to the universities which sets, within very narrow limits, the level of salary settlements within the universities. Although internal financial pressures may differ amongst the universities, the overall result on salary increments across the province has been very similar for a number of years.

The goal to be achieved in a provincial system is, stated in its simplest terms, adequate support for academic salaries in terms of both salary levels and faculty

*Council of Ontario Universities

**Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations.

numbers. On the question of levels, such a system would enable the university community to face government directly with its responsibility for equitable salaries for university professors. The cost of achieving an equitable level is not only the cost of compensating individuals reasonably but also the necessity to meet the additional cost requirements of the present skewed age distribution, the continuing cost legacy of the enormous expansion undertaken in the 1960's. The universities also need to gain adequate support for long range staffing stability in relation to year-to-year and institution-to-institution fluctuations in enrolments. Long range stability in the area of academic staffing will do much to improve the universities' ability to plan their development and adjust to fluctuating student demands and preferences. Without this stability we are likely to lurch along and miss opportunities for new initiatives in higher education. We are all acutely aware of the residual costs of expansion and the necessity of seeing new junior appointments made. The working group believes that a concerted province-wide attack on these two problems would hold the residual costs of expansion to an acceptable level while providing the needed stability over the difficult period, the next twenty years.

If a provincial system could be achieved to attain these goals the effect would be to remove much turbulence and conflict from local campuses and to provide an alternative to industrial-model collective bargaining on the local scene.

There are a number of difficulties and dangers associated with the development of a provincial scheme which must be faced and assessed.

(1) The fundamental difficulty is that a provincial approach would inevitably mean some loss of independence on the part of individual institutions. The working group has held as a objective the keeping of this loss of independence to an absolute minimum. But there is a price to be paid in return for the advantages of a provincial system, and it must be faced. In evaluating this, the question should be asked: how much freedom do the institutions now have in the salary arena?

(2) The provincial system which we will outline necessitates the earmarking of funding for academic salaries. There may be a tendency for such an approach over time to lead to the earmarking of other components of university funding (for example, salaries of librarians or non-academic staff), possibly resulting in a budget-category funding system very different from the present enrolment-based BIU system.

(3) There will be difficulties in dealing with the historic differences amongst institutions in salary and benefit levels and staff establishments. We are not yet in a position to assess how great these difficulties may be. (4) It is also hard to know whether dealing directly with the provincial government would in fact improve salary funding. There is as well the danger that government would wish to negotiate teaching loads and other working conditions.

The Components of Salary Negotiations

In the approach which we are developing, certain elements would be negotiated on a province-wide basis and others would be reserved for individual university decision.

The following would be the subject of province-wide negotiation:

- a) the average increase in full-time academic salaries to cover cost of living increases (increments to scale)

- b) the average amount to be allowed for discretionary salary increases to full-time academics (career progress/merit funds)

- c) the average increase in fringe benefits related to salary.

The following would be the subject of individual university decision:

- a) salary floors for each academic rank
- b) career progress/merit policies
- c) individual salaries
- d) equivalents to benefits (sabbatical allowances, etc.)
- e) all other salary-related matters not covered in the joint negotiations.

The Problem of Faculty Numbers

It is fundamental to our approach that the question of faculty numbers must be tackled jointly by the universities and government. In any event, it would not be realistic to assume that government would be prepared to negotiate salaries without having some role in determining the size of staff establishment.

One of the main problems of the present formula is that it is so sensitive to enrolment fluctuations in the short run. In a time when increases in across-the-board support (value of the BIU) are grossly inadequate, great strains are placed upon the system. The number of students to be taught will always be an important factor in determining the overall size of government allocations, and thus justification of staffing numbers will always be influenced by projections of student demand. We are seeking an approach which would be responsive to changes in enrolment over the long term (both increases and decreases) with a smoothing device to minimize short-term perturbations. The advantages of this approach would be staffing predictability to enable wise and effective planning, and for individual faculty members, reasonable career prospects which will minimize the insecurities of the redundancy problem.

The problem is clearly revealed in the enrolment experience of the last several years and in enrolment projections for the remainder of the 1970's and the 1980's. Over the past few years, enrolment in the system has been growing, although at a rate lower than in the early sixties. The rate, however, has fluctuated from year to year both in total and for individual institutions. Enrolment changes in any one institution in a given year vary by a considerable margin around the provincial average. In some universities, and in some programmes, growth has been limited by deliberate policy. This is likely to be increasingly the case.

The experience of the last several years has made us wary about precise projections, but there are unmistakable winds of change. Present indications are that enrolment will increase slowly but steadily at an average rate of about 3% per annum for the remainder of the 1970's. University enrolment in the 1980's, according to current demographic projections of the high school population, is likely to plateau or perhaps even decline somewhat. By the beginning of the 1990's, the high school pool will increase and university enrolment may well begin to grow again. There are, of course, a number of other variables affecting enrolment which add to the uncertainties. The nature of the university and the inherent characteristics of the academic career compel us to believe that some way of providing a reasonable stability to academic staffing for the system and for individual institutions over this period must be found.

It is on this question of staff establishment where we must be most careful to steer a

course between the Scylla of failing to recognize the differential roles which have evolved for the institutions and the Charybdis of perpetuating any historical inequities which may exist. The first danger would be courted if we proposed an entitlement system based on a province-wide staff/student ratio (in some form). The second danger would be courted if we proposed a system based exclusively on existing institutional staff/student ratios.

We have so far explored in some detail two approaches to this problem. The first approach is a temporary one which would allow the system to move into provincial salary negotiations for a two year period (1976-77 and 1977-78) while providing time for exhaustive study of the problem of faculty entitlement. For the initial two year period, faculty entitlement would be based on historical staff/student ratios with, say, a 50% adjustment for increases and decreases of enrolment. There would also be a floor, the level to be determined, below which a university could not fall if it experienced a sudden enrolment decline. The advantage of this approach is that it would buy time until adjustments could be made. This approach could coexist with a system of formula financing by the earmarking of the academic salary portion of university grants. Experience in the province of Quebec shows that an historical approach cannot be maintained over the longer term, but can be effective for a relatively short time.

The other approach which we have looked at is more complicated, but might enable the system to adopt a predictable staffing policy for a longer period of time. The starting point would be to develop a weighted staff/faculty ratio for the system and for each university. On the principle that diversity in the system is deemed desirable there would be no compulsion to move the individual university ratios to the provincial average. However, recognizing that there are probably some anomalies which cannot be justified, a constraining limit on the system would be that any variations in individual university ratios would have to be towards the provincial average, not away from it. With this approach, we apply a damper similar to that in the first approach. In times of increasing enrolment, university entitlement to hire faculty would be for the next year a number of faculty equalled to some fraction (in the range of $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$) of the difference between the current number of faculty and the lesser of the year's entitlement for the institution based on its historical ratio or the year's entitlement as projected by a two-year extrapolation. A similar approach would apply in times of decreasing enrolment. In this case one would take half of the current deficit, or half of the projected deficit, whichever is less. Again, some limit on the maximum annual decrement would have to be specified. We estimate that given the problems involved with shifts in student course preference, one percent is probably all that could be managed annually without serious disruption of the universities and their programs.

Whether either of these approaches or some other one to the faculty entitlement question should be adopted will require a great deal of discussion and feasibility modelling on their effects.

Treatment of Factors in Provincial Negotiations

Increments to scale

This is the least problematic element. Its purpose is to maintain comparability in academic salaries with the general level of wage increase, particularly in order to recognize

inflation in the cost of living. This is an across-the-board adjustment which would be negotiated annually in relation to external indicators.

Career progress/merit funds

A merit component is often identified separately in discussions of salary policy. For the purposes of this model, we view the allocation of merit increases as being achieved through differential rates of career progress.

Two factors must be accounted for here. The first is establishing a reasonable average rate of career progress for faculty members. This is often referred to as "progress through the ranks" but for our purposes it is not related to ranks as such. An example of a career progress curve is shown in the graph attached as Appendix 1, representing the University of Waterloo salary policy. A provincial salary system would require some such average curve for the generation of funds. It is not necessary, though, that individual universities adopt the same curve, as long as they can create an acceptable career progress/merit policy within the constraints of the funds made available.

The second factor required in a provincial approach to funding of career progress/merit is recognition of the legitimate costs of the present skewed age distribution. In an institution with a steady state balanced staffing profile, one would need to deal with only average salary, since funds would be released by terminations of higher-salaried staff to meet the requirements of moving junior staff through the steeper slope of the career profile. (The definition of a balanced age distribution is that ages are evenly spread over the career profile and that the average age does not shift.) It is clear that at present all universities find themselves in the situation where if they faced the next few years exactly the same staff as present, the average salary would progress steadily and alarmingly on account of the steadily advancing average age.

The funds required on account of career progress under present circumstances are defined by the difference between the actual costs of moving staff through the accepted provincial norm of career progress and the funds recovered on account of terminations. In order to evaluate this factor, we will need to examine data for the system and each campus on the age distribution and rates of attrition of faculty. The collection of this type of data is presently underway under the auspices of the joint OCUFA/COU Committee on Academic Career Development.

Fringe benefits increase

The need for increments in fringe benefits funding would be treated in a similar way to scale increments. Fringe benefit increases can be expressed as a percentage in relation to overall salary increases.

There are some problems in this area, however. First, extraordinary pension plan funding requirements must be excluded (these are discussed separately below). Second, there are real differences in the cost of fringe benefits relating to the characteristics of institutions even where the benefits are similar. (Data on these differences will be required.) Some means of dealing with this problem needs to be found. Third, in most universities, fringe benefit rates for academic staff are tied to those for non-academic staff. To make this approach work, they might need to be untied, and, if so, the feasibility of this must be explored. We are nonetheless reticent to propose a provincial salary negotiation system which does not include fringe benefits, since these benefits are a very im-

portant and visible part of faculty compensation.

Other Problem Areas

There are problems to be dealt with in developing a provincial salary system which we have identified in the course of discussion. Some of these are essentially technical and are likely to be easily resolved through further study. Others are more substantive, but we believe that all could be resolved through further discussion. Some of the problems are:

- (1) *The definition of faculty.* For the sake of simplicity, we have concentrated on the core of full-time academic staff. It will be necessary to work out a means of handling salaries of part-time staff, teaching assistants, etc. Policy on resource allocation at various institutions has led to significant differences in the percentage of teaching effort accounted for by full-time staff. These differences must be recognized, since we do not wish to constrain the flexibility of the institutions in this regard.
- (2) *Salaries related to academic staff.* A decision must be made on the method of handling salaries of other university staff closely related to academic staff, such as librarians, computer staff, etc.
- (3) *The special circumstances of health sciences clinical staff.* The salary treatment of clinical staff in health sciences involves a number of complications which must be dealt with because of multiple sources of funding.
- (4) *Overload teaching.* Although the volume of stipends for overload teaching in the Ontario universities has been reduced considerably in recent years as a result of deliberate policy, it is unlikely that the concept of overload can be removed. If overload is defined at the provincial level, there must be a definition of normal load.
- (5) *Market differentials.* There may be a need to recognize special market adjustments for specific groups (e.g. lawyers).
- (6) *Sabbaticals.* As is the case with fringe benefits, sabbatical policy is an important part of the faculty compensation package, and this policy varies amongst the institutions. In addition, the cost of a university sabbatical policy will differ depending on practices regarding replacement.
- (7) *Differences in age mix and turnover.* A system based on provincial norms may cause difficulties because of the differences amongst the institutions in age mix and turnover.
- (8) *Regional differences in cost of living.* The relation of regional differences in cost of living to academic salaries in the province has never been examined. It may be that this needs to be addressed.
- (9) *A mechanism for the adjustment for past service pension liability.* Periodic adjustments must take place in the funding of pension plan liability. There are extraordinary expenses which must be excluded and dealt with ad hoc. Perhaps the government might agree to special grants.

There are major problems in the pension area which will not go away and must be addressed. At present we simply wish to note that we recognize the importance of the pension problem, and propose that discussions between OCUFA and COU on this problem be reactivated. These discussions should involve government.

Mechanism for Salary Negotiation

The working group spent only a brief time on discussing the mechanism for salary negotiations. We did, however, have the benefit of the accounts of a visit to the United

Kingdom written by the Chairman of OCUFA and the Executive Director of COU. On the basis of our discussion of these accounts, we are at the moment disposed to propose the following system, which resembles closely the British system. The approach would involve two tiers or stages.

The first tier (in the U.K. terminology Committee A) would involve negotiations between representatives of the presidents (perhaps recognized formally in the structure of COU) and of OCUFA. Committee A would be chaired by an independent chairman. The two parties in Committee A would negotiate, and if agreement were not reached, the Chairman would develop the final position. In going to the second stage (Committee B in the U.K. terminology) the parties would be bound to support the proposal generated in Committee A either by negotiation or by the Chairman.

In the Committee B stage, the negotiations would be between Committee A and the government. We have not yet considered the question of the chairmanship of Committee B. This Committee would negotiate, and a mechanism for arbitration would be needed. The decisions of the Committee B stage, reached either by negotiation or by arbitration, would be considered binding, subject, of course, to the overriding authority of the Legislature.

It will be essential to define the role of the Ontario Council on University Affairs in these negotiations, given its critical responsibility for the health of the university system. This should be explored at an early date with OCUA.

Where we go from here

The purpose of this progress report is to solicit reaction from the university community and to obtain authority for the working group to continue its explorations. If a proposal of the sort we have outlined above is to be implemented, we believe that it must be in place for the 1976-77 academic year. Given the time horizon that universities require for planning, the time is short. We envision the following schedule:

- (1) *Response from presidents and OCUFA.* (February 15, 1975)

We would like to have reactions from the presidents and OCUFA and approval of these groups to develop a formal proposal for submission to the individual universities and OCUFA.

- (2) *Discussions with representatives of OCUA.* (January — February 1975)

Concurrently with the review of this progress report by the presidents and OCUFA, we will undertake informal discussions with representatives of OCUA.

- (3) *Formal approval by the universities and OCUFA.* (May 1975)

- (4) *Formal review with OCUA.* (June 1975)

- (5) *Formal proposal to government.*

Subject to the response of OCUA, a formal proposal to government would be presented as early as possible, with the hope that an agreement would be forthcoming by early in the Fall of 1975.

Arthur N. Bourns, McMaster University
Norma V. Bowen, University of Guelph
Robert D. Chambers, Trent University
John R. Evans, University of Toronto
Michael Oliver, Carleton University
Jack L. Ord, University of Waterloo

Saturday, January 11, 1975.

Council Summary

A summary of action taken at the November and December Council meetings follows. The results of the January meeting appear on page 1.

November 6 meeting: (23 members present):

Under "business arising from the minutes," Council endorsed the proposed grievance panel and its initial membership. The necessity of this procedure was due to the fact that almost all candidates approached feared real or potential conflict of interest in one or more cases. Council also approved the membership of the Salary Committee, which is: D. Sida (chairman), Mathematics; B. Wand (Philosophy); L. Copley (Physics), and G. Neuspiel (Law).

Council passed unanimously a resolution establishing a Collective Bargaining Committee. The membership and revised terms of reference (resulting from the November 29th general meeting) are described under the December Council meeting.

The Steering Committee's proposed response to the memo of Mr. Brombal, Director of Administrative Services, concerning the Staff Welfare/Advisory Committee, was passed with amendments, and it was moved and passed that the Steering Committee be instructed to carry the matter of Mr. Brombal's memo and our response to the Staff Welfare Committee of the Board of Governors.

Concerning the "redundancy" document, it was resolved that CUASA accept, with appropriate amendments, the recommendations of CAUT to the Senate, and demand negotiations with the Board of Governors.

In response to an invitation from the Clerk of Senate for representation on a Joint Board-Senate committee on changes to the Carleton University Act, it was resolved that we request observer status only. (At a subsequent Steering Committee meeting, Prof. Laughton was named as our observer.)

A notice of motion concerning CUASA finances was presented by Prof. Farmer.

December 16 meeting (25 members present):

Council voted unanimously to approve the terms of reference and membership of the Collective Bargaining Committee. The committee would be responsible for education of the membership and for consideration of membership for professional librarians, and would report before the January general meeting. Membership is: Professors Vickers, Wand, Sida (Steering Committee); Professors Brook (Arts I), Neuspiel (Arts II), Urrello (St. Pat's); Cormack (Engineering), and Copley (Science). In addition, the completed membership of the grievance panel was approved.


Council accepted in principle the Steering Committee's "Report on 'Negotiations' concerning the Staff Welfare Advisory Committee", and discussed the kind of information and help available from CAUT and OCUFA on collective bargaining. The following recommendations of the Salary Committee were accepted in principle:

- 1) That we delay the opening of formal salary discussions until clearer information concerning the university's true financial situation for 1975-76 is available (late January)
- 2) That this brief and other documentary evidence be presented to the administration to indicate the line of thought at Carleton and in the system concerning fair increases.
- 3) (as amended) That CUASA initiate informal discussions with the administration based on the Salary Committee's brief and on their understanding of the present circumstances regarding finances.

A motion that Council consider "a special levy to increase our solvency and/or an

increase in dues to be put before the membership at the annual general meeting" was tabled for consideration in January.

A motion to approve in principle the proposals in the document "A Severance Pay Policy Proposal for Council" was passed with one dissenting vote.



OCUFA Teaching Awards

The third annual OCUFA teaching awards program has been launched.

The concept of such a series of awards was advanced by Jim Stevens (Department of Physics, University of Guelph) in 1972, then Chairman of OCUFA — the first series of awards being made in 1973. The awards are a concrete contribution by OCUFA to the resurgence of interest in the area of instruction, teaching and course development.

While it might have been possible to devise a "standard" evaluation guide, it was decided to direct the onus for preparing nominations and supporting material to the nominee. Since many universities have established or are establishing mechanisms for assessing instructional endeavours, it was felt that it would be unwise to try to impose any external constraints on these efforts.

Submissions are not restricted to nominations for excellence in classroom or laboratory work by an individual faculty member. Course preparation, team teaching, audio-visual work and the authoring of text books are all matters of importance to instruction, and outstanding work in any of these areas would render nominees eligible for an award.

Nominations made by any person or group within a university are acceptable.

In 1973, fifteen awards were made, one of which went to Professor Gilles Paquet, Department of Economics, at Carleton. In 1974, the maximum number (20) of awards were made — again one went to Carleton — Professor J.H. Sigler in the Department of Political Science.

Nominations for the 1975 awards should be forwarded to: Professor S.F. Gallagher, Chairman, OCUFA Committee on Teaching Awards, 40 Sussex Avenue, Toronto M5S 1J7. The deadline for receipt of nominations is **March 15, 1975.**

CUASA Council 1974-75

Steering Committee

President

J.M. Vickers (Political Science) 2712

President-elect

B. Wand (Philosophy) 3868

Past president

W.E. Walther (SPC) 2734

Secretary

J. F. Campbell (Psychology, SPC) 2666

Treasurer

C.H. Langford (Chemistry) 6738

Salary Chairman

D.W. Sida (Mathematics) 6752

Staff Welfare Chairman

P.M. Laughton (Chemistry) 6675

Arts I

J. Brook (Philosophy) 3868

A. Elbaz (French) 3853

J. Healy (English) 3877

G. Melnikov (Russian) 4488

L. Read (Religion) 3861

T.J. Scanlon (Journalism) 5530

J. Taylor (History) 2777

Arts II

M. Frumhartz (Sociology-Anth.) 2689

K. Fuerst (School of Social Work) 3677

T.R. Harmstone (I.S.E.E.S.) 2711

K.A.J. Hay (Economics) 4379

G. Neuspiel (Law) 3618

P. Rosen (Political Science) 3809

St. Patrick's College

C. Farmer (Sociology) 4370

A. Urrello (Spanish) 2690

Architecture

J. Mather 6380

Engineering

G. Cormack (Electronics & Materials) 2721

B. Fletcher (Civil Engineering) 2618

J. Lukasiewicz

(Aerothermodynamics) 3883

Science

C.L. Chakrabarti (Chemistry) 5685

L. Copley (Physics) 6630

L. May (Mathematics) 6788

G. Skippen (Geology) 2630

CUASA Office

The CUASA Office is located in Room 424, Physics. The phone number is 6387. Hours are:

Wednesdays 9:30-11:30; 1:30-3:30

Fridays 9:30-11:30

and many other times. The mailbox (CUASA, 424 Physics) is checked every day, so that members unable to reach the office by phone are encouraged to write.

Prelude '75

A letter has been received inviting all members of the faculty association to attend Prelude '75, an event for the entire Carleton community.

Prelude '75 is to be held at the Chateau Laurier on March 22nd. Tickets will be on sale at the Community Switchboard, 4th level, University Centre, at \$16.50 or \$17.50.